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Abstract
The marginal cost of public funds (MCF ) measures the cost to the
economy of raising government revenue. The MCF can be used to guide
reform of the tax system and to determine an e¢ cient level of government
expenditure. It can also be used as an input into cost-benet analysis.
Previous applications of the concept have developed a methodology in a
context of a static economy. We develop the methodology of the MCF
to extend the concept to growing economies. The extended concept is
then applied to variants of the Barro endogenous growth model with a
productive public input. The MCF is used to address the choice between
labour and capital taxes and to explore the implications of infrastructural
spill-overs across regions.
JEL Classication : E6, H4, H7
Key Words : Growth, externalities, infrastructure, public funds
1 Introduction
All implementable government tax instruments are distortionary and, as a con-
sequence, impose deadweight losses upon the economy. These distortions are
the inevitable cost of collecting the nance required to support public spending.
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The correct level of spending achieves a compromise between these distortions
and the benets of spending. There are large literatures on cost-benet analy-
sis (Mishan and Quah, 2007) and optimal taxation (Myles, 1995) that describe
how this should be done. The Marginal Cost of Public Funds (MCF ) provides
the link between these literatures since it measures the cost of raising revenue
which is determined by the degree of e¢ ciency of the tax system. The existing
literature on the MCF is almost entirely restricted to static economies.1 In
contrast, there is now a considerable body of work on optimal tax structures in
growing economies. The purpose of this paper is to show how the concept of
the MCF can be extended and applied to economies with growth. The results
from using the extended MCF are then linked to the Chamley-Judd (Chamley
1986, Judd 1985) results on optimal taxation.
What matters for the spending decision is whether the marginal benet of
spending exceeds the marginal cost of taxation. If it does, then additional
public spending is justied. This principle of contrasting marginal benet and
marginal cost underlies the methodology of cost-benet analysis. The survey of
Drèze and Stern (1987) provides a summary of the standard approach to cost-
benet analysis that emphasizes the role of theMCF. That approach is based on
the Arrow-Debreu representation of the competitive economy and its extensions.
The generality of the model permits it to encompass many situations but for
specic problems alternative models can be advantageous. The questions we
wish to focus upon involve economic growth. Although growth can be handled
by dating commodities in the Arrow-Debreu framework it does seem preferable
to employ a more specic model of the growth process. The models we analyze
in this paper are extensions of the Barro model of endogenous growth with
productive public expenditure. We also combine the endogenous growth model
with scal federalism and the public input interpreted as a form of infrastructure
that has spill-overs between jurisdictions.
A government has access to a wide range of di¤erent tax instruments. Taxes
can be levied on consumption or on income. Di¤erent forms of consumption,
and di¤erent sources of income, can be taxed at di¤erent rates. Taxes can also
be levied on rms, using prot, turnover, or input use as a base. The cost of
collecting revenue will depend upon the tax base that is chosen and the structure
of rates that are levied. Each tax instrument has an associated MCF which is
a measure of the cost of raising tax revenue using that tax. The values of the
MCF for individual tax instruments can be used to identify changes to the
tax structure that raise welfare keeping expenditure constant. They can also
identify the best tax instruments to use for raising additional revenue. When the
tax system is e¢ cient the value of the MCF is equalized across tax instruments
and can be used to determine the optimal level of expenditure. The MCF is a
practical tool that permits consistent analysis of taxation choices. Dahlby (2008)
provides a detailed summary of the existing methods for calculating the MCF
in a wide variety of circumstances and for a range of tax instruments. However,
there is very little literature on the derivation of theMCF for a growing economy.
1The two exceptions are Dahlby (2006) and Liu (2003).
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Section 2 of the paper provides a brief review of theMCF from a cost-benet
perspective and a summary of several typical applications. Some of the issues
involved in applying the MCF to growing economies are discussed in Section 3.
A general discussion of the MCF for a growing economy is given in Section 4.
Section 5 analyses a basic model of endogenous growth and Section 6 extends the
model to incorporate infrastructural spill-overs and tax externalities. Section 7
provides concluding comments.
2 Application of the MCF
TheMCF provides a numerical summary of the welfare cost of raising additional
revenue from each tax instrument. Consider the e¤ect of a marginal increase in
a single rate of tax. This has two e¤ects: it will raise additional revenue for the
government (provided the economy is on the correctside of the La¤er curve)
but will reduce social welfare. The MCF is dened as (minus) the ratio of the
welfare e¤ect to the revenue e¤ect so it gives the welfare reduction per unit of
additional revenue.
A formal construction of the MCF can be provided as follows. Consider an
economy that can employ m tax instruments to nance g public goods. Denote
the level of tax instrument i by  i and the quantity of public good j by Gj .
Welfare is given by the social welfare function W ( ;G) where  = (1; :::; n)
and G = (G1; :::; Gg), the level of revenue by R ( ;G), and the cost of the public
good supply by C (G). Note that there is an interaction in the revenue function
between taxes and public good supply but the cost of public goods is determined
by technology alone.
The optimization problem for the government is2
max
f;Gg
W ( ;G) s.t. R ( ;G)  C (G) : (1)
To analyze the solution to this optimization dene i by
i =  @W=@ i
@R=@ i
; i = 1; :::;m: (2)
The term i is the Marginal Cost of Funds from tax instrument i. It measures
the cost, in units of welfare, of raising an additional unit of revenue.3 If the tax
system is e¢ cient then i is equalized across the di¤erent tax instruments: i =
; for all i, and equals the Lagrange multiplier associated with the governments
budget constraint.4 If the value of i di¤ers across tax instruments then welfare
can be raised by collecting more revenue from taxes with low (but positive) i
and less revenue from those with high i.
2The solution to this optimization is studied in detail in Atkinson and Stern (1974) .
3 In applications revenue is typically denominated in monetary units but in this formal
(non-monetary) model it is denominated in units of the numeraire commodity.
4The converse does not necessarily hold: the common value can be negative, implying that
the level of revenue is falling as taxes increase, or even zero. Neither situation is e¢ cient.
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Now assume that the tax instruments have been optimized so that i =
 > 0. The use of the MCF in project choice can be illustrated by writing the
optimality condition for the level of public good j as
@W
@Gj
= 

@C
@Gj
  @R
@Gj

; j = 1; :::; g: (3)
This conditions says that the quantity of provision of each public good is optimal
when the marginal benet of that extra provision (@W=@Gj) is equal to the net
cost of the public good (@C=@Gj   @R=@Gj) converted into welfare units using
the MCF. This analysis can be extended to include asymmetric information
by adding appropriate incentive compatibility constraints to programme (1). In
such a case, however, the optimum need not involve a common value of i for all
tax instruments since the multipliers on the incentive compatibility constraints
will also enter the optimality conditions.
The properties of i and  are investigated in Hashimzade and Myles (2013).
Assume that @W=@ i is negative for low  i but may become zero for high
 i (if the tax is su¢ ciently high to discourage the respective activity), and
that @R=@ i is positive for low  i (the upward slope of the La¤er curve),
possibly negative for higher  i; and, eventually, may become zero. Under these
assumptions it is shown that i can, in principle, take any value, including 1,
or can be undened (when both @W=@ i and @R=@ i are zero). It also has a
discontinuity at the value of  i that maximizes revenue (given the value of other
tax instruments).
The denition in (2) shows that i and  are denominated in units of wel-
fare/revenue and that can be used to convert monetary costs into welfare equiv-
alents. Furthermore, i and  are unique only up to multiplicative transfor-
mation, both in the cases when W ( ;G) is ordinal or cardinal. That is, given
n tax instruments, for every permissible transformation of the social welfare
function there is a choice of n di¤erent numeraires for revenue and each results
in a di¤erent numerical value for i and . Another way to look at this is that
i is denominated in units of welfare/revenue, and its value changes when we
change the units of measurement for either welfare or revenue. One response
to this fact is to accept that i provides only a ranking of tax instruments
(and , respectively, provides a ranking of the e¢ cient tax systems) for a given
transformation of the welfare function and choice of numeraire. In other words,
the ranking is ordinal, and so the numerical value is not in itself meaningful.
An alternative response is to develop a unit-free form of the MCF that is not
a¤ected by transformation of the social welfare function or choice of numeraire.
To produce a unit-free version of the i let  be any quantity measured in
welfare/revenue units. Then a normalized form of the i is given by
Ni =
i

: (4)
For given  the value of Ni is uniquely dened since any transformation of the
welfare function or choice of numeraire must be applied to  as well as i. How-
ever, this does not make the measure unique since the tax rates and public good
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levels at which the normalizing factor, , is evaluated, need to be chosen. Di¤er-
ent choice will provide di¤erent numerical values of Ni . This point can be seen
by considering a model with a representative consumer. In that case one can
use the private marginal utility of income5 as the normalizing factor. The value
of the marginal utility will depend on  and G at which it is evaluated. The
choose of specic values, denoted
n
^ ; G^
o
; is constrained by the requirement at
R

^ ; G^

 C
 bG; each choice satisfying this condition is equally acceptable
but will result in a di¤erent numerical value for Ni . Hashimzade and Myles
(2013) also observe that a unit-free MCF can be obtained by using the com-
pensating variation or equivalent variation to measure welfare change (see also
Diamond and McFadden, 1974).
We would like to emphasize that using the comparison of the numerical val-
ues for the MCF obtained under di¤erent normalization and di¤erent welfare
measures is inappropriate. Furthermore, using the extent to which the MCF
for a particular tax instrument di¤ers from 1 as the measure of the degree of
distortion of that instrument can be misleading. This is an important point
since many applications implicitly assume that an MCF of 1 represents a non-
distortionary tax instrument and that any distortionary tax must have an MCF
in excess of 1. In fact, as shown in Atkinson and Stern (1974), the MCF cal-
culated using normalization by the private marginal utility of income can be
less than 1 for a distortionary tax system (labour income tax) if the income
e¤ect on labor supply is su¢ ciently negative. It should also be stressed that
the use of money-metricwelfare measures avoids the issues connected with
normalization but raises another di¢ culty: the aggregation of the money-metric
measure across heterogeneous consumers. This is an issue for which there is no
compelling resolution (Hammond, 1994).
This non-uniqueness in the denition of the MCF is linked to the discussion
of the use of the di¤erential approach versus the balanced-budget approach to
the analysis of the welfare cost of taxation (Ballard, 1990). Di¤erential analysis
compares alternative means of raising the same amount of revenue, whereas the
balanced-budget analysis is concerned with a change in the level of revenue and
a simultaneous change of the tax system to nance this additional revenue. The
numerical value can be very sensitive to the choice of the welfare measure and
the reference point, as shown in Triest (1990). While a chosen normalization can
be used to compare the extent of welfare loss under two di¤erent distortionary
tax instruments, it cannot be meaningfully used to measure the extent of welfare
loss under one particular distortionary tax system.
To summarize, a set of techniques has been developed in the formal literature
that permit the MCF to be calculated and to be integrated into cost-benet
analysis. Numerous further examples of such applications are described in the
comprehensive text of Dahlby (2008). However, despite this extensive literature
there are still a number of signicant issues that need to be addressed if the
5The private marginal utility of income is dened as the derivative of the indirect utility
function with respect to income.
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MCF is to be used e¤ectively in policy design.
3 The MCF, Economic Growth, and Externali-
ties
The analysis of the MCF given above is very general and, conceptually, can
be applied to any economy. The cost of this generality is an absence of detail
concerning the economic model behind the welfare function and the cost func-
tion. This observation becomes important when theMCF is applied to practical
policy questions. For example, applying the MCF to the case of an economy
with multiple jurisdictions or an economic union, such as the EU, raises sev-
eral questions. First, the use of a single objective function is an issue in an
integrated economic area but with subsidiarity permitting independence in pol-
icy. Secondly, the economic integration amplies externalities between member
states of the EU or between jurisdictions in a federal state, that are not captured
by the general formulation. Finally, the relationship between scal policy and
economic growth has emerged in recent years as a focal point for the attention
of EU policy makers. In contrast, almost all analysis of the MCF has been
undertaken for static economies.
The implication of these comments is that there are benets to be obtained
by rening the analysis of the MCF to apply in a growth model with multi-
ple jurisdictions. The formal developments of the MCF have been based upon
the Arrow-Debreu model which can incorporate time in the form of dated com-
modities but must have all contracts agreed prior to the commencement of
economic activity. Consequently, it is not a compelling representation of the
growth process. Similarly, the applications of the MCF reviewed are typically
set within a single-country model. Such a renement would need to include
the role of individual member states and the externalities that link the member
states. Dahlby and Wilson (2003) make some progress in this respect by ana-
lyzing a model that includes scal externalities. Their model has both a central
government and a local government. Both governments levy taxes on labour
incomes and prot, which gives rise to vertical tax externalities linking the two
levels of government. The main result is the demonstration that a local gov-
ernment that does not take into account the e¤ect of its choices on the central
government may have an MCF that is biased up or down.
Endogenous growth occurs when capital and labour are augmented by addi-
tional inputs in a production function that otherwise has non-increasing returns
to scale. One interesting case for understanding the link between government
policy and growth is when the additional input is a public good or public in-
frastructure nanced by taxation. The need for public infrastructure to support
private capital in production provides a positive role for public expenditure and
a direct mechanism through which policy can a¤ect growth. Introducing in-
frastructure permits an analysis of the optimal level of public expenditure in an
endogenous growth model.
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The importance of infrastructure is widely recognized, not least by the EU
which pursues an active programme to support the investment activities of mem-
ber states. The policy problem facing the EU is to ensure that member states
undertake an e¢ cient level of infrastructural expenditure that ensures the max-
imum rate of growth. The determination of the level has to take into account
the full consequences of an infrastructure project for the EU, not just the di-
rect benets for the member state undertaking the investment. The MCF can
be used to evaluate public infrastructure provision but its use has to recognize
three signicant issues. First, infrastructural investment has signicant spill-
overs across member states. Second, mobility of the tax base results in tax
externalities between the member states, and between the member states and
the EU. Third, the EU is faced with a decision on how to allocate support for
infrastructural expenditure across the di¤erent member states. This interacts
with the process of revenue-raising, and with the extent to which the projects
are nanced jointly by the EU and member states. The same is true of the
relationship between the local and central government nancing in a federal
state.
The economic modelling of the impact of infrastructure on economic growth
has focussed on the Barro (1990) model of public expenditure as a public input
and its extensions (Chen et al. 2005, Turnovsky, 1999). This literature has
identied the concept of an optimal level of expenditure, and has highlighted
the deleterious e¤ects of both inadequate and excessive expenditure. These are
important insights, but they do not address the spill-over issues that confront a
federation. Infrastructural spill-overs between the members of a federation can
be positive, which occurs when improvements in infrastructure in one region
raise productivity in another, or they can be negative if they induce relocation of
capital between regions. In either case, it is important to develop an appropriate
concept of theMCF that would correctly capture the benets and costs of public
investment in the presence of spill-overs.
4 Dynamic Setting
There has been little investigation of the MCF in growing economies. Two
exceptions are Liu (2003) who computes the MCF as a component of a cost-
benet analysis (but taking the intertemporal path of wage rates and interest
rates as exogenous) and Dahlby (2006) who uses the MCF to analyze public
debt in an AK growth model. Our approach is similar to Dahlby but we employ
a more general model of endogenous growth. In principle, it is possible to treat
the economy lying behind (1) as intertemporal but the analysis needs to be more
specic to generate worthwhile conclusions.
Consider an intertemporal economy set in discrete time. The time path for
tax instrument i is a sequence

1i ; 
2
i ; : : :
	
. The MCF is computed for a vari-
ation in this sequence. A pulse variation takes the form of a change in the
tax instrument in a single time period, t. The new sequence would then be
1i ; : : : ; 
t 1
i ;b ti;  t+1i ; : : :	. Alternatively, a sustained variation in the tax in-
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strument from period t onwards changes the sequence to
n
1i ; : : : ; 
t 1
i ;b ti;b t+1i ; : : :o.
We choose to focus on sustained variations. Correspondingly, we extend the de-
nition of the MCF for a static economy to an intertemporal economy by using
ti   
@W=@ i
@R=@ i
;
to denote the MCF of a sustained variation in tax instrument i from period t
onwards. In this setting W is the intertemporal social welfare function, and R
is discounted value of tax revenue.
In a dynamic, innite horizon economy
R =
1X
t=0
d (t)Rt;
where Rt is tax revenue in period t, and d (t) is the discount factor applied to
revenues in period t: There are many well-known issues involved in the choice of
the sequence of discount factors fd (t)g. We choose to remain with the standard
convention (see, for example, Nordhaus, 2008) of appealing to market equilib-
rium to determine the social rate of time preference endogenously. In this case
d (t) =
@W=@Ct
@W=@C0
;
where Ct is consumption at time t. If the welfare function is time-separable
with exponential discounting, that is, W =
P1
t=0 
tUt (Ct; ), then
d (t) = t
@Ut=@Ct
@U0=@C0
: (5)
The purpose of the analysis is to apply the MCF in settings where economic
growth is occurring. This requires us to embed the MCF within a model of
endogenous growth. The major di¢ cultly here is that, generally, the entire
intertemporal path for the economy must be computed from the present into
the indenite future. To overcome this di¢ culty we focus upon balanced growth
paths. Along a balanced growth path all real variables grow at the same rate,
so such a path can be interpreted as describing the pattern of long-run growth.
All the commonly used growth models have the property that the economy will
converge to a balanced growth path from an arbitrary initial position.
4.1 Public Infrastructure in Barro Model
This section develops the MCF for a growing economy by building on the Barro
(1990) model of productive public expenditure. In particular, the model is
used to illustrate the benets of focussing on the balanced growth path. This
analysis provides the developments that we need to combine endogenous growth
with scal federalism and infrastructural spill-overs in Section 6.
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Public infrastructure is introduced by assuming that the production function
for the representative rm at time t has the form
Yt = AL
1 
t K

t G
1 
t ;
where A is a positive constant and Gt is the quantity of public infrastructure.
The form of this production function ensures that there are constant returns to
scale in labour, Lt, and private capital, Kt, for the rm given a xed level of
public infrastructure. Although returns are decreasing to private capital as the
level of capital is increased for xed levels of labour and public input, there are
constant returns to scale in public input and private capital together.
With  denoting the tax upon output, the prot level of the rm is
t = (1  )Yt   rtKt   wtLt;
where rt is the interest rate and wt the wage rate. Prot maximization requires
that the use of capital satises the necessary condition
@t
@Kt
= (1  )A

Gt
Kt
Lt
1 
  rt = 0: (6)
This can be solved to give
rt = (1  )A (gtLt)1  ; (7)
where gt  Gt=Kt .
The rm belongs to a representative innitely-lived household whose prefer-
ences are described by an instantaneous utility function, U (Ct; Lt). The house-
hold maximizes the innite discounted stream of utility,W =
P1
t=0 
tU (Ct; Lt),
subject to the sequence of intertemporal budget constraints
Ct +Kt+1 = (1  K + rt)Kt + wtLt + t; (8)
and with the sequence of taxes and government infrastructure taken as given.
Here K is the rate of depreciation of private capital. We can write the rst-
order conditions for the optimal consumption path as
@U=@Ct
@U=@Ct+1
=  (1  K + rt+1) ; (9)
The public capital input is nanced by the tax on output, and there is no
government debt, so that the government budget constraint is
Gt = Yt:
On a balanced growth path the real variables (Yt; Ct;Kt; Gt) grow at the
same constant rate, . Markets also clear in every period and rt = r for all t.
We assume for this analysis that labour supply is constant, and normalize it to
one, Lt = 1: On a balanced growth path Ct+1 = (1 + )Ct where  is the rate of
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growth. Assuming the logarithmic form for the instantaneous utility function,
U (Ct) = ln (Ct), the rst-order conditions (9) become
Ct+1
Ct
=  (1  K + rt+1) : (10)
Using (7), (8), and (10), the following set of equations obtains for the bal-
anced growth path:
c = (1  )Ag1    K   ; (11)
 = 
 
1  K + (1  )Ag1 
  1; (12)
g = (A)
1=
; (13)
where c  Ct=Kt is the consumption to capital ratio. The model permits a
closed-form solution for all endogenous variables. In particular, for the growth
rate we have
 = 

1  K + A1= (1  )  (1 )=

  1: (14)
The growth rate is maximized at  = 1  .
4.2 MCF with Output Tax
Along the balanced growth path when utility is logarithmic, the discount factor
dened in (5) is
d =


1 + 
t
; (15)
which implies
R =
1X
t=0


1 + 
t
Yt =
K0
1  Ag
1 : (16)
The MCF is calculated with g constant so assuming the sustained variation in
the tax occurs from period 0 onwards:
@R
@
=
K0
1  Ag
1 : (17)
For the welfare function with logarithmic utility we have
W =
1X
t=0
t ln (Ct) =
ln (cK0)
1   +

(1  )2 ln (1 + ) ; (18)
where c  Ct=Kt. This implies
@W
@
=  Ag
1 
1  

1  
c
+
2
1  
1
1 + 

: (19)
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Combining (17) and (19) allows the MCF to be computed as
 =  @W=@
@R=@
=
1
K0

1  
c
+
2
1  
1
1 + 

: (20)
Following Dahlby (2006) we dene the normalized MCF by dividing  in
(20) by the marginal utility of income at time 0 (denoted by I0),
N =   1
@W=@I0
@W=@
@R=@
This provides a unit-free measure of the cost of public funds. For the specica-
tion of utility in this model the marginal utility of income at time 0 is given by
1=C0 = 1=cK0. Hence, using (20),
N = 1   + 
2
1  
c
1 + 
: (21)
From (11)-(13) it is easy to obtain
c =
1  

(1 + )  1  

(1  K) ;
and, therefore,
MCFN =
1  
1    
(1  K)2
1  
1
1 + 
; (22)
where  is given by (14).
Figure 1 plots the values of the key endogenous variables against the level
of the tax. Here, and in other model specications used later in the paper, we
employ values for the models parameters that are broadly consistent with the
calibration of business cycle and growth models; see, for example, Cooley and
Prescott (1995). In this specication of the economy the level of welfare is an
increasing function of the growth rate, and so is at a maximum when the growth
rate is highest, that is, at  = 1   . The same is true of the consumption to
capital ratio and the normalized marginal cost of funds. For low levels of the tax
rate growth is negative because of insu¢ cient provision of public infrastructure.
It can be seen that N in this calibration is everywhere above 1.
We can now use the expression for N in (21) to verify that the optimality
condition (3) holds in this model, which is the implication of the Diamond and
Mirrlees (1971) result. To derive the Diamond-Mirrlees result, observe that
in the balanced growth path equilibrium Yt = AKtg1 , and in the dynamic
setting the marginal benet calculated as the innite discounted sum of the
marginal productivities in every time period, with the discount factor (15),
@C
@g
=
1X
t=0


1 + 
t
dYt
dg
=
1X
t=0


1 + 
t
(1  )AKtg  = 1  
1  AK0g
 :
(23)
11
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Figure 1: Tax on output ( = 0:6,  = 0:8, A = 2, K = 0:2, K0 = 2)
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With the tax on output the marginal benet is an increase in welfare (normalized
by the marginal utility of income at time 0):
MBg =
@W=@g
@W=@I0
:
From (18),
@W
@g
=
1
1  
1
c
@c
@g
+

(1  )2
1
1 + 
@
@g
;
and, using (11)-(12),
@W
@g
=
(1  ) (1  )
1   Ag
 

1  
c
+
2
1  
1
1 + 

;
so that
MBg =
(1  ) (1  )
1   AK0g
 

1   + 
2
1  
c
1 + 

: (24)
The optimality condition requires
MBg = 
N

@C
@g
  @R
@g

;
or, using (16), (21), and (24),
@C
@g
=
@R
@g
+
MBg
N
=
K0
1   (1  )AK0g
  +
(1  ) (1  )
1   AK0g
 
=
1  
1  AK0g
 ;
which is exactly the same as (23) for the lump-sum tax nancing of the public
input, i.e. the Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) result that optimal tax system does
not distort production decision holds in this situation.
5 MCF with Input Taxes
We now analyze a dynamic economy described in the previous section under
alternative assumptions about nancing of the public input in production. In
particular, it is interesting to compare theMCF in equilibrium under the output
tax with the MCF in equilibrium under taxes on capital and labour. First, we
analyze the case with inelastic labour supply and a tax on private capital. Next,
we add labour supply as a choice variable to the model and consider government
spending nanced by taxes on capital input and labour income. These taxes
distort the choice of inputs so the MCF will reect this. We also assume that
public infrastructure can be accumulated as a stock.
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5.1 Capital Tax
In this section we assume that government spending is funded from a tax levied
on the private capital input. The consumersoptimization problem remains the
same as described in section 4.1. The tax on the private capital input is denoted
by K6 . We now assume that the public capital stock accumulates over time by
assuming that the depreciation rate is G 2 [0; 1]. Again, there is no government
debt so the government budget constraint at time t is
Gt+1 = (1  G)Gt + KKt+1:
On the balanced growth path the real variables (Yt; Ct;Kt; Gt; wt) grow at
the same constant rate, . Markets also clear in every period, the interest rate is
constant, and the available labour is normalized to one. The normalized version
of the MCF in this economy is given by
N =
1  
1   +
(1  )2
1  
1  K   K
1 + 
: (25)
The details of the derivation can be found in the Appendix. This model does not
permit a closed-form solution; however, we show that N is strictly increasing
in the tax rate, whereas the growth rate is maximized when the tax solves

=(1 )
K = [ (1  )A]1=(1 )
241 + 1  G


1  K + 1 K

  1 + G
35 : (26)
Using parameterization illustrated in Figure 2 ( = 0:8; K = G = 0:15;
A = 1; K0 = 2) this gives for the growth-maximizing tax and the corresponding
growth rate, (K ; ) = (0:294; 0:0328) for  = 0:6, (0:249; 0:0511) for  = 0:65,
and (0:211; 0:0734) for  = 0:7. We also show that there is no longer a direct
link between the growth rate and the level of welfare. In fact, the maximum
rate of growth is achieved before welfare is maximized.
The relationships between the endogenous variables and the tax are plotted
in Figure 2 for three di¤erent values of . The N and the consumption-capital
ratio are decreasing in , whereas the growth rate is increasing. These compet-
ing e¤ects produce a single-crossing property in welfare: it increases with  for
low K but decreases for high K . The 
N reaches high values for modest levels
of the tax so that the capital tax rapidly becomes increasingly distortionary.
This is not surprising given the important role that capital plays in sustaining
growth in this economy.
6Note that the tax, K ; on capital input is equivalent to a tax on income from capital at
rate ~K ; with ~K =
K
rt+K
: Provided rt satises 0 < rt  K <1; then ~K ! 0 as K ! 0,
and ~K ! 1 as K ! 0: This should be borne in mind when contrasting with the labour
income tax.
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Figure 2: Tax on capital ( = 0:6 (solid), 0:65 (dash), 0:7 (dot),  = 0:8;
K = G = 0:15; A = 1; K0 = 2)
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5.2 Tax on capital and labour
The model is now extended to make labour supply elastic. This makes it in-
teresting to analyze a capital tax and a labour tax since both instruments are
distortionary. We assume that the instantaneous utility has the Cobb-Douglas
form
U (Ct; Lt) =  ln (Ct) + (1  ) ln (1  Lt) : (27)
Labour income is taxed at rate L, and at tax of K is levied on the private
capital input. The public capital input is nanced by the tax on capital input
and on the labour income. We assume, as before, that the government does not
issue debt. The government budget constraint in period t is therefore
Gt = (1  G)Gt 1 + KKt + LwtLt:
The achievement of the balanced growth path when public capital is modelled
as a stock variable has been analyzed in Gómez (2004) and Turnovsky (1997).
Turnovsky assumes that investments in public capital and private capital are
reversible. This allows immediate adjustment to the balanced growth path via
a downward jump in one of the capital stock variables. Without reversibility it
is shown by Gómez that the optimal transition path requires investment in one
of the two capital variables to be zero until the balanced growth path is reached.
The normalized MCF s for the two instruments are7
NK =
c
K

(1  L) !
c
"KL  

1  

1 + 
"K   "Kc

;
NL =
c
!L (1 + "L!)

(1  L) !
c
"LL  

1  

1 + 
"L   "Lc

;
where
!  wtLt=Kt; "ic 
 i
c
@c
@ i
; "iL 
 i
L
@L
@ i
; "i 
 i

@
@ i
; i = K;L.
are elasticities with respect to the tax rates. These results are rst interpreted,
and then numerically evaluated.
The terms in the expression evaluate the three e¤ects that the tax changes
have upon the economy. The rst elasticity, "KL , reects the distortion of labour
supply. The second, "K , concerns the e¤ect of the tax on the growth rate.
The nal elasticity, "Kc , captures the impact on intertemporal allocation since it
relates to the change in consumption relative to saving. It should be noted that
these are not behavioral elasticities but are instead the elasticities of equilibrium
values and that they depend on the tax rates at which they are evaluated. To
help understand the contribution of each elasticity to the overall values of NK
and NL : Table 1 reports the values of the elasticities for our baseline equilibrium.
The table shows that the elasticity of the equilibrium consumption-capital ratio,
c, and the elasticity of the equilibrium quantity of labour are negative but
7See Appendix for details.
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"Kc "
K
L "
K
 "
L
c "
L
L "
L

 0:0225 0:0347  15:91  0:3878  0:0629  1:648
Table 1: Elasticities (tK = tL = 0:25)
are small in value. The elasticity of the growth rate (which reects changes
in capital accumulation) is negative and large for both taxes. However, the
latter is weighted by a term involving the growth rate which for practical values
(captured by the range 0 to 0.06 in our simulations) will be small. An increase
in the (absolute) value of any of the elasticities will increase the two normalized
MCF s.
The expressions we have derived for two tax instruments are now numerically
analyzed for a calibrated version of the model. Figure 3 shows how the growth
rate, level of welfare, consumption-capital ratio, and NK for the capital tax
change with the rate of tax on private capital input, for three di¤erent levels
of labour income tax. In Figure 4 the roles of the capital tax and the labour
tax are reversed and the NL is plotted for three values of the tax on labour
income. Over the range plotted in Figure 3 one can see that the decrease in
consumption with a higher rate of labour income tax in this economy is more
than o¤set by the increase in the growth rate, so that for a given level of the
capital tax the welfare level is higher with a higher labour tax rate. A similar
pattern is observed for the capital tax. NK is reduced by an increase in labour
tax but, conversely, NL is raised by an increase in the capital tax. Both 
N
K and
NL increase rapidly as the taxes are raised and 
N
L is clearly convex in the tax
rate. Both are less than one for low taxes since the growth-enhancing e¤ect is
dominant and exceed two for moderate values of the tax rates. The fact that NK
is greater than NL is a reection of the Chamley-Judd result that the optimal
capital tax in a growth model should be zero (Chamley 1986, Judd 1985).
6 MCF with Infrastructural Spill-Overs
This section analyzesMCF in a two-country model that incorporates infrastruc-
tural spill-overs between countries. The discussion that follows refers to the
EU context; the same analysis applies to any federal state with multiple juris-
dictions. The model builds upon that in Hashimzade and Myles (2010) with
the intention of capturing the important feature of the EU that productive in-
vestments by one member state have benets for other neighboring states. In
general, independent policy-setting by countries will lead to under-investment
in infrastructure in such a setting because of the positive externality generated
by the spill-over. This provides a role for a supra-national body to coordinate
the decisions of individual countries so as to secure an increase in the growth
rate. It also has implications for the value of the MCF. We are interested in
discovering how these externalities a¤ect the value of the MCF .
The rst step is to introduce the externality between countries caused by
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Figure 3: Tax on capital and labour
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productive public input. Let Gt and Gt denote productive public input in the
home and in the foreign country, respectively, and let  t = Gt+Gt be the total
public input at home and abroad. The level of output in the home country is
given by
Yt = AL
1 
t K

t

G1 t  

t
1 
: (28)
There is no externality when  = 0. To simplify the analysis we assume labour
is inelastic and normalize the quantity to one. The optimization problem of the
home consumer is to maximize intertemporal utility taking as given the levels
of capital and public good as well as the rate of growth in the foreign country.
We assume that there is no redistribution of the tax revenues across coun-
tries, and that the home and the foreign countries set their tax rates indepen-
dently. The home (foreign) country nances their public spending by a tax K
(K) on private capital input at rate , and there is no government debt. Thus,
for the home country
Gt = (1  G)Gt 1 + KKt: (29)
We focus on balanced growth paths along which all real variables in all
countries grow at the same rate and the tax rates are constant over time. The
equality of the growth rates across countries here is imposed, since the law of
motion of the public capital in one country only ensures that the growth rates
of the stock of public and private capital are equal in that country, but there is
no reason of why the growth rates should be equal across countries. If we did
not impose this assumption then the output of one country would eventually
become arbitrarily small relative to the output of the other.
When the externality from the infrastructural spill-over is present, W de-
pends on the growth rate in both home and foreign country. Thus, in the pres-
ence of externalities, the welfare of the home consumer depends on the home
tax rate through its own growth rate as well as the growth rate in the foreign
country,
W =
lnK0
1   +
1X
t=0
tt ln (1 + ) +
1X
t=0
t ln c (; ) (30)
where
c (; ) = Ag1 
"
1 +

1 + 
1 + 
t+1
G0
G0
#(1 )
     K   K :
and
1 + 

= A
"
1 +

1 + 
1 + 
t
G0
G0
#(1 )
+ 1  K   K ; (31)
1 + 

= A
"
1 +

1 + 
1 + 
t
G0
G0
#(1 )
+ 1  K   K : (32)
20
The details of the calculations are provided in Hashimzade and Myles (2010).
For the normalized MCF we have
N = (1  ) c
"
@W
@K

;
+
@W
@
@
@K
+
@W
@
@
@K
#
=
;
where the partial derivatives of  and  by taking the total di¤erential of
(31)-(32). The resulting expressions are cumbersome and do not provide much
insight. To illustrate the pattern we present a numerical solution for a symmetric
equilibrium calculated for a range of parameters.
Figure 5 depicts the solution for symmetric equilibrium in the model with
two identical countries. It can be seen that an increase in the extent of the
spill-over (measured by ) reduces N , so that greater spill-overs decrease the
cost of funding projects. One explanation for an increased spill-over could be
economic integration, which suggests that the single-market programme may
have consequences for the cost of nancing public projects. The N increases
with the tax rate but over the range displayed so do the growth rate and welfare.
7 Conclusions
The marginal cost of public funds has a central role in the assessment of tax
policy and in cost-benet analysis. The MCF provides a measure of the cost
of raising revenue through distortionary taxation that can be set against the
benets of a public sector project. Despite the importance of the concept the
current literature has focussed upon the MCF in static settings. Only a very
small literature has so far considered it within a growth setting.
In this paper we have computed the MCF in a variety of endogenous growth
models with public infrastructure. To do this we have built upon the denition
of theMCF in an intertemporal setting provided by Dahlby (2006). The models
that have been analyzed are extensions of the Barro model of productive public
expenditure, but with the public input represented as a stock rather than a ow.
In addition, we have also introduced externalities between countries which are
a consequence of spill-overs from public infrastructure. To evaluate the MCF
we assume that the economy is on a balanced growth path which permits the
evaluation of welfare in terms of a balanced growth rate. This technique provides
a basis for determining the MCF for a variety of tax instruments in a form that
can be empirically evaluated.
We have employed the standard parameter values for calibration used in
real business cycle and growth models to simulate the models. Our results
demonstrate that there is a link between theMCF and the growth rate, and that
theMCF is sensitive to the tax rate. In the calibrated simulation the normalized
MCF can take high values for quite reasonable values of tax rates. This indicates
that the e¤ect upon the growth rate can exacerbate the static distortions caused
by taxation. In every case the MCF is increasing and monotonic over a range
of capital input and labour income tax rates similar to those seen in practice.
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In the model with an infrastructural spill-over it is interesting to observe that
an increase in the spill-over e¤ect reduced the MCF.
The analysis has been restricted here by the focus on balanced growth paths.
It might be thought necessary to consider the transition path but there is limited
evidence on the length of such transition. We have considered only sustained
variations in tax rates and have implicitly assumed credibility of government
announcements and commitment to announced policies. This removed any need
to consider the formation of expectations or games played between the public
and private sectors. If there is any strategic interaction this would change the
value of the MCF.8 The benet of these restrictions is the simplication they
provide to the analysis and the fact that they can be applied in a similar manner
to more complex models.
The MCF is an important concept in tax policy and cost-benet analysis.
Although it generally appears in a static setting it can be extended to growth
models. Our approach to the MCF is suitable for numerical evaluation in more
complex economic environments. An avenue for exploring the practical value of
this methodology could be to consider the e¤ect of capital mobility upon the
MCF, and to embed it in a more general model that can incorporate several
countries and a broader range of tax instruments. This latter model will form
the basis of empirical implementation using a combination of calibration and
estimation.
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A Appendix
A.1 Balanced growth path and theMCF with capital tax
The consumersoptimization problem remains the same as in the model with
output tax. The tax on the private capital input is denoted by K . Net of tax
prot is
t = Yt   (rt + K)Kt   wtLt:
The prot maximization condition implies that
rt = A (gtLt)
1    K :
The government budget constraint at time t is
Gt+1 = (1  G)Gt + KKt+1:
On the balanced growth path the real variables (Yt; Ct;Kt; Gt; wt) grow at
the same constant rate, . Markets also clear in every period and rt = r for all
t. Normalizing available labour to one, we obtain the following set of equations
describing the balanced growth path
r = Ag1    K ; (33)
c = Ag1    K      K ; (34)
 = 
 
1  K   K + Ag1 
  1; (35)
g =
1 + 
 + G
K : (36)
In this case there is no closed form solution for  in terms of K when the
dependence of g upon K is taken into account.
For the present value of tax revenues we have
R =
1X
t=0


1 + 
t
KKt =
K0
1   ;
from which it follows that
@R
@K
=
K0
1   :
The welfare function remains as described by (18), and so
 =
1
K0

1  
c
+
2
1  
1
1 + 

:
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This MCF can be used directly or, dividing by the marginal utility of income
at time 0, converted into the normalized version
N = 1   + 
2
1  
c
1 + 
: (37)
Using (35) in (34) we obtain
c =
1  

(1 + )  1  

(1  K   K) ; (38)
which implies
N =
1  
1    
(1  )2
1  
1  K   K
1 + 
:
To investigate how the growth rate and the N depends on the tax rate we
use implicit di¤erentiation in (35)-(36):
@
@K
= 
 (1  )Ag1    1=K
1 +  (1  )Ag K ( + G) = ( + G)2
: (39)
The expression in the numerator equals zero at the value of the tax rate given
implicitly by eK =  (1  )Aeg1 ; (40)
where eg is evaluated at  = eK . Using this in (35) gives the corresponding
maximum rate of growth,
e = 1  K + 
1  eK

  1:
From this equation
eK = 1  


1 + 

  1 + K

;
and substitution into (36) gives
eg =
0@1 + 1  G


1  K + 1 eK  1 + G
1AeK :
Finally, using this in (40) gives, after obvious rearrangement, an implicit ex-
pression for the growth-maximizing tax rate:
e=(1 )K = [ (1  )A]1=(1 )
241 + 1  G


1  K + 1 eK  1 + G
35 :
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The right-hand side is positive and increasing function of eK on (0;1), and the
left-hand side is positive and decreasing function of eK on (K ;1), where K =
1 


1 G
   1 + K

. Therefore, a unique solution exists on (max f0; Kg ;1).
Next, for N di¤erentiation with respect to the tax rate gives
@N
@K
=
(1  )2
(1  ) (1 + )

1 +
K
1 + 
@
@K

:
Using (39) and (36), after straightforward manipulations, we obtain
@N
@K
=
(1  )2
(1  ) (1 + )
 (1  )Ag1  + ( + K)

1

  K
1 + 

 (1  )Ag  (g   K) + ( + G) = :
This is strictly positive, since g   K = K 1  G
 + G
 0 and 1

> 1 >
K
1 + 
.
Therefore, N is monotonically increasing in the tax rate.
For the welfare function we have
W =
ln (cK0)
1   +

(1  )2 ln (1 + ) ;
where c is given by (38). Di¤erentiation with respect to the tax rate gives
@c
@K
=
1  

+
1  

@
@K
;
@W
@K
=
1
1  
1
c

1  

+
1  

@
@K

+

(1  )2
1
1 + 
@
@K
:
In particular, this implies that at the tax rate where growth is maximized
( @@K = 0) the consumption to capital ratio and the welfare are increasing
( @c@K > 0,
@W
@K
> 0). That is, the maximum growth rate is achieved before
welfare is maximized.
To verify the optimality condition in this model observe that, from (34)-(35),
MBg = cK0
@W
@g
=
1  
1  AK0g
 

1   + 
2
1  
c
1 + 

:
and
@R
@g
= 0. Therefore, using (37),
@C
@g
=
MBg
N
=
1  
1  AK0g
 ;
which, again, is the marginal benet of the public input nanced by lump-sum
tax.
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A.2 Balanced growth path and theMCF with tax on cap-
ital and labour
The private capital input is taxed at rate K . Net of tax prot is
t = Yt   (rt + K)Kt   wtLt:
From the necessary conditions for the choice of capital and labour inputs we
obtain
rt = A (gtLt)
1    K ;
and
wt = (1  )A (gtLt)1  Kt
Lt
;
where, as before, gt  Gt=Kt.
The representative consumer has intertemporal preferences
W =
1X
t=0
tU (Ct; Lt) ; (41)
where the instantaneous utility has the Cobb-Douglas form
U (Ct; Lt) =  ln (Ct) + (1  ) ln (1  Lt) : (42)
Labour income is taxed at rate L, and so the consumers budget constraint is
Ct +Kt+1 = (1  K + rt)Kt + (1  L)wtLt + t: (43)
Upon substitution of (42) and (43) into (41) we can write the rst-order condi-
tions for the intertemporal paths of consumption and labour supply as
Ct+1
Ct
=  (1  K + rt+1) ;
Ct
1  Lt =

1   (1  L)wt:
The public capital input is nanced by the tax on capital input and on the
labour income. We assume, as before, that the government does not issue debt.
The government budget constraint in period t is therefore
Gt = (1  G)Gt 1 + KKt + LwtLt:
Employing the conditions developed above the balanced growth path is de-
scribed by the following set of equations
r = A (gL)
1    K ; (44)
! = (1  )A (gL)1  ; (45)
c = (r   K   ) + (1  L)!; (46)
 =  (1  K + r)  1; (47)
1
L
=
1  

c
(1  L)! + 1; (48)
g =
1 + 
 + G
(K + !L) : (49)
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where c  Ct=Kt and !  wtLt=Kt.
In the balanced growth path equilibrium the present value of tax revenues
are given by
R =
1X
t=0


1 + 
t
(KKt + LwtLt) =
K0
1   (K + !L) ;
so that
@R
@K
=
K0
1   ;
@R
@L
=
K0!
1  
 
1 + "L!

; (50)
where "L! 
L
!
@!
@L
. The welfare function can be written as
W =
1X
t=0
tU (Ct; Lt) =
1X
t=0
t [ lnCt + (1  ) ln (1  Lt)]
=
1X
t=0
t
h
 ln
h
cK0 (1 + )
t
i
+ (1  ) ln (1  L)
i
=
1
1   [ ln (cK0) + (1  ) ln (1  L)] +

(1  )2  ln (1 + ) : (51)
Di¤erentiation with respect to the tax rates gives
@W
@ i
=
1
1  


c
@c
@ i
  1  
1  L
@L
@ i

+

(1  )2

1 + 
@
@ i
(52)
=
1
1  

 i
h
"ic   (1  L)
!
c
"iL
i
+

(1  )2

1 + 

 i
"i ;
where
"ic 
 i
c
@c
@ i
; "iL 
 i
L
@L
@ i
; "i 
 i

@
@ i
; i = K;L.
Using (50) and (52) the MCF for the two tax instruments can be expressed in
terms of elasticities by
K =

KK0

"Kc   (1  L)
!
c
"KL +

1  

1 + 
"K

;
L =

!L (1 + "L!)K0

"Lc   (1  L)
!
c
"LL +

1  

1 + 
"L

:
The marginal utility of income is now =(cK0). Thus, the normalized MCF s
for the two instruments are
NK =
c
K

"Kc   (1  L)
!
c
"KL +

1  

1 + 
"K

;
NL =
c
!L (1 + "L!)

"Lc   (1  L)
!
c
"LL +

1  

1 + 
"L

;
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To calculate the elasticities we use (44) to eliminate r from (45) to (48) and
take the total di¤erential of each resulting equation holding g constant. This
process produces the matrix equation
A

dc d d! dL
T
= B

dK dL
T
;
where
A=
2666666664
0
1

  
1   0
 1 1  

1  L 0
1
c
0   1
!
1
L (1  L)
0 0  1 (1  ) !
L
3777777775
; B =
26664
 1 0
0 !
0   1
1  L
0 0
37775 :
This equation can be solved to yield the derivatives and, hence, the elasticities
with respect to the tax rates.
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